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Audit of emergency preparedness on Kristin

Audit: The Petroleum Safety Authority Norway (PSA) carried out an audit of emergency preparedness on the Kristin facility during the period 31 March - 2 April 2008. Our general impression following this audit is that the emergency preparedness on board the facility is safeguarded in a satisfactory manner.

During the audit, we particularly emphasised the facility's means of evacuation, the emergency response organisation, emergency response equipment and the personnel's qualifications in relation to the emergency preparedness functions they will perform.

The audit was carried out by reviewing documents, conducting interviews, conversations and verifications.

About Kristin
Kristin is located in the Norwegian Sea 20 km south-west of Åsgard. The field was proven in 1997. The Plan for Development and Operation was approved in December 2001.

Link:  Consent for use of Kristin

Background for the audit
The audit was a planned activity in accordance with our audit schedule for 2008.

The audit was based on Chapter III-IV of the Facilities Regulations relating to emergency preparedness, Chapter VI-II of the Activities Regulations relating to competence and Chapter XI relating to emergency preparedness.

Purpose of the audit
The purpose of the audit was to verify that StatoilHydro safeguards emergency preparedness-related issues on Kristin in accordance with regulatory requirements, including organisation and safeguarding of its own emergency response organisation, means of evacuation, maintenance of the emergency response equipment and maintenance of the qualifications of personnel in relation to the emergency preparedness functions they will perform.

Result of the audit
The audit revealed no nonconformities in relation to regulatory requirements.

However, we observed the following items with a potential for improvement, which are further explained in the audit report under section 5.0 Observations:

  1. Deficient systematics for carrying out training and drills for deputy members of the emergency response organisation.
  2. An overview of actions following training and drills is not readily available
  3. Discrepancy between StatoilHydro's governing document WR 1156 and the practical implementation of the maritime coordinator's task in connection with flagging of crane in MOB boat activities
  4. Deficient systematics in connection with follow-up of competence in the emergency response organisation
  5. D & V Lead has no qualifications as OIM.

An emergency preparedness drill was carried out involving a scenario with a gas leak in the process module and injured personnel. The SAR helicopter from Heidrun participated in the drill. An MOB drill was also carried out. Our general impression after the audit is that  emergency preparedness on board Kristin is safeguarded in a satisfactory manner.