The audit was carried out through meetings, interviews and verification on 23 April and 23-26 August 2010.
Statoil is in the process of installing new living quarters modules on Troll A simultaneously with the facility being fully operational.
The audit is related to the PSA's main prioritisation management and major accident risk. Over the last couple of years, several incident investigations and audit activities have proven e.g. deficient planning and HSE and risk communication on the part of the contractor and operator, excessive haste and deficient management.
The purpose of the audit activity was to follow up Statoil's management of risk, safety, health, working environment and emergency preparedness in a phase with simultaneous operations and project work on board.
We looked at management in the interface between project and daily operations, and between the operator and contractor, management of capacity and competence, the use of night work and overtime as well as access and emergency preparedness.
The audit of materials handling and lifting operations was carried out as a separate activity and a separate report will be prepared regarding this part of the audit.
Our impression was one of good cooperation and communication between the facility and project management. There also appeared to be good follow-up of the individual work teams and individual employees as regards information concerning safeguarding health, working environment and safety in the project activiteties on the facility.
However, we did note deficient systematics in the overall management of the risk of health and working environment loads. Key analyses carried out prior to the activities had not identified otherwise known challenges relating to implementation of certain types of operations. This has resulted in Statoil using mitigating actions instead of facilitating the working environment conditions to ensure that the employees are not exposed to working environment or health-related risk. We also cannot see how Statoil uses the management tools the company has presented to the PSA to achieve measurable results, and thus learning and improvement.
We also noted uncertainty surrounding responsibilities as regards planning, coordination and follow-up in establishing temporary escape routes in the external areas, as well as deficient information regarding the opportunity to breach certain cordons in an evacuation situation.
The PSA has processed the impact assessment of night work in connection with the project as a separate matter, cf. the letter dated 16 July 2010 where we e.g. issued an order to carry out an assessment of whether the night work on Troll A is in accordance with Section 53 of the Framework Regulations regarding night work, and the following correspondence.
No non-conformities were identified during the audit.
We identified two improvement items during the audt, relating to:
Øyvind Midttun, press contact
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